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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOGGAN & HALL & HIGGINS,
INC., a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.
10453

v.
NELSON "\V. HALL and RAYMOND C. HIGGINS,

Defendants and Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Because respondent has raised certain new issues
both as to the nature of its claim and dehors the record,
as to the disposition of certain preliminary matters by
ihe eourl below, appellants are compelled to file this
brief in reply thereto. Although appellants feel that the
statements made relating to respondent's motion for
preliminary iujunction are immaterial to the ultimate
1

disposition of this case, it is important that this comt
not be misled into believing that the court below at the
hearing upon respondent's motion for preliminary injunction restrained appellants from continuing to senice the five advertising customers in question. Respondent fails to point out in its brief that it sought preliminarily to enjoin appellants from both soliciting and senicing the five advertising accounts in question. Respondent further fails to point out that the court specif- '
ically excluded these five accounts from the effect of its
preliminary injunction. The order was not, as respon- ,
dent suggests, that appellants were restrained from the
"further solicitation" of respondent's customers.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
RESPONDENT MAY NOT CHANGE ITS ,
THEORY OF RECOVERY ON APPEAL.
Respondent throughout Point IV of its brief claims
that it is entitled to recover a money judgment from
the defendants based not only upon such loss as it may ,
have sustained by reason of the alleged wrongful con·
duct of appellants, but also upon the gain and enrich·
ment derived by appellants as a result thereof. An
examination of plaintiff's complaint and the Pre-Trial
Order entered below indicate clearly that the action
commenced by respondent was for the recovery of
"damages" by reason of certain tortious conduct. No·
2

here in the pleadings, the Pre-Trial Order nor the
pruof of the case did respondent seek to impress a con:-ilrudiYe trust upon the stock of appellants in the new
corporation formed by them.Nowhere in the pleadings,
tlic Pre-Trial Order or the proof did respondent ask
for a11 accounting from appellants of the profits which
they had derived to the time of trial from servicing the
customers formerly serviced by respondent. Now here
in the pleadings, the Pre-Trial Order or the proof did
respondent request a judgment based upon the theory
of money had and received by reason of the profits or
gain derived by appellants from these customers to the
time of trial. Respondent's action was pleaded and
proYed on the theory of recovering damages for the loss
sustaiued by it - no more. It requires no citation for
the fundamental proposition that a party cannot proceed on one theory below and another on appeal. Indeed,
as will be hereinafter demonstrated, respondent could
not recover on both theories, even had it pleaded both
theories; hut it was required, as it did, to make an election between the two.
11

POINT II.
UESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT IT IS
ENTITLED TO A MONEY JUDGMENT
BASED IN PART UPON THE LOSS SUFFERED AND IN PART UPON THE GAIN
DERI\'ED BY APPELLANTS IS ERRONEOt'S, BECAUSE THE T'VO ARE ALTERXATI \'E AND INCONSISTENT RE]_\,1EDIES.

3

As hereinabove stated, respondent in its brief ,
attempts to justify the award of damages below by
asserting that the trial court could, as it did, base its
award in part on the gain or enrichment derived by
appellants from servicing the customers allegedly
wrongfully solicited.
As pointed out in appellants' original brief, the
trial court based its award of damages upon findings
relating to (I) the gross revenue derived by the respondent from these customers and ( 2) the salary received
by the appellant Hall from the new corporation of
Higgins & Hall, Inc. By asserting that it is entitled
to a money judgment based upon both factors, respondent wants to have its cake and eat it too.
An examination of each of the cases cited by
respondent in support of its contention reveals that the
sole remedy therein sought by the plaintiff corporation
was for equitable relief by way of constructive trust
and an accounting for profits derived. In no case did the
corporation seek in addition thereto damages by way
of compensation for the loss sustained by reason of the
wrongful act of the corporate director or officer involved.
Among those cases cited by respondent is the landmark case of Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A2d 503 (Del.). In
order to obtain a complete factual picture of this case,
it is necessary also to read the reported decision of the
trial court which appears in the case of Loft, Inc. v.
Guth, 2 A2d 225 (Del.). The facts of that case, as
gleaned from both op1mons, were that the defendant
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(; u th was president of the plaintiff corporation, Loft,
lite.. 1111til Oetober 21, 1935, at which time he resigned
J 11 s office. During the years 1931 to 1935, Guth dominated LofL Inc. and controlled Pepsi-Cola Company,
:t Delaware corporation. During this time, without the
knowle(lge or consent of Loft's Board of Directors,
(~uth speut his energies developing Pepsi-Cola Company; drawing upon the resources of Loft without
limit; using, for the benefit of Pepsi-Cola Company,
Loft's plant, its facilities, its materials, its credit and
e,·en its employees to further his purpose. Loft filed an
adiou against Guth to impress a trust in its favor up011
all shares of the capital stock of Pepsi-Cola registered
in the name of Guth, to transfer these shares to Loft
arnl for an accounting. It did not also seek damages
for its losses. The Chancellor's Decree, affirmed on
appeal, required Guth to transfer his shares in PepsiCola Company to Loft; required Guth to account for
and pay to Loft monies representing dividends declared
on this stock prior to transfer; required Guth to account
for and pay to Loft any other profits or gains attriblltable to his shares of stock in Pepsi-Cola Company;
and required Guth to pay to Loft all salary or compensation paid to him by Pepsi-Cola Company prior to
October 21, 1935, the date of his resignation from Loft,
tugether with all salary paid by Pepsi-Cola Company
tu Loft subsequent to October 21, 1935, in excess of
\\hat should be determined to be reasonable, with Guth
to be ereclited with such sums as found due to him or
l" Pep~i-Cola Company from Loft.
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It is interesting to note that in the instant case,
respondent contends that appellant Hall's salary frun 1
the new corporation should properly be considered b~·
the court in awarding a money judgment, regardles.~
of the fact that it was earned subsequent to his resignation as an officer and director of respondent; regardless
of the reasonableness thereof; regardless of the amount
thereof that may be attributable to the customers allegedly solicited from respondent; and in addition, not a.y an
alternative to its claim for compensatory damages for
the loss sustained by respondent.

Respondent, in its argument, overlooks two crucial
phrases in its quotation from the Loft case at Page 43
of its brief, and its quotation from the Lutherland case
on Page 42 of its brief. That phrase is "at its election."
In the cases cited by respondent, the corporation elected
to pursue its equitable remedies in lieu of any claim for
damages for the loss sustained by the wrongful conduct
of the corporate officer or director.
The case of Sears, Roebuck ~ Co. v. Blade, 123
F.Supp. 131 ( S.D. Calif. 1954), highlights the error
committed by the trial court below and compounded
by respondent in its brief. The plaintiff corporation in
this case commenced an action for damages for fraud
by its employee in conspiring with two engravers in the
Los Angeles area for secret commissions, in the naturr
of kickbacks, in exchange for which the engravers received through the employee Blade an exclusive han<lliug
of all of Sears' newspaper mat engravings at a price
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higlicr than that customarily paid in the area. Sears
had, prior to the Federal Court action, brought an action
iu the Superior Court of Los Angeles for the State of
California against Blade for money had and received
on the theory of his having obtained secret profits in
breach of his fiduciary relation to the corporation. Blade
moved for a summary judgment in the Federal court
action on the theory that there had been an election of
remedies by virtue of the prior state court proceedings.
The court granted the motion for summary judgment
stating in pertinent part as follows:

"The suit in the Superior Court was for money
had and received - it is ex contractu; the suit
here is ex delicto. They are inconsistent."

*

*

*

"By electing to sue ex contractu in the state
court, plaintiff waived the tort by Blade and
cannot waive half a tort by suing in contract
and then sue in another case for the other half
of the tort. When one sues ex contractu, whether
on an expressed or implied contract, the bringing
of that suit affirms the contract. It is the essence
of the plaintiff's cause of action in the within case
that it disaffirms and disavows the acts of Blade
in letting contracts and receiving money from
his co-defendants; it is the essence of the plaintiff's cause of action in the state court that the
defendant, Blade, WM under the obligation of
an imvlied contract to pay over to the plaintiff
all monies that he received." (Emphasis supplied)
So it is in the instant case that respondent, by seekmg compensatory damages for the loss it sustained,
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necessarily disaffirmed the acts and conduct comphnc•
of. In order to obtain the gains an<l benetibi deri\c,;
by appellants on the theory that such benefits '.\'('\\
derived for the benefit of the respondent corpora~io11,
respondent must necessarily affirm said acts and conduct. The two positions are obviously inconsistent.
The Restatement of Trusts 2d, Section 205, states
the remedies available to the cestui que trust in the
alternative as follows:
"If the trustee commits a breach of trust, he is
chargeable with:

(a) any loss or depreciation in vc.tlue of lhc
trust estate resulting from the breach of trust;

or

( b) any profit made by him through the breach
of trust; or
( c) any profit which would have accrued to
the trust estate if there had been no breach of
trust." (Emphasis supplied)
The Restatement of Trusts 2d, at Section
states as follows:

~Oti.

"The rule as stated in Section 205 is applicable
where the trustee in breach of trust sells trmt
property to himself individually, or sells his individual property to himself as trustee, or otherwise violates his duty of loyalty."
Throughout the Restatement, it is made clear thnl
these remedies are alternative, not cumulative. For e\
ample, in Section 2H, Restatement, ibid., the court igiven the option to enforce 'vhichever of the se-reral
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oltcn/{/fivc remedies is most appropriate for the purposes

of the trust, \vhere there is disagreement among the
beuefkiaries or where one of two or more beneficiaries
is under an incapacity.

See also W cightman v. Hadley, 248 P.2d 801 (Cal.
App. 1952), which albeit on facts substantially different
from those of the instant case, stated the general rule
dearly applicable to the instant case as follows:
"This was not an action at law for conversion
of the stock. 'Vhen plaintiff sued in equity for
the proceeds of a sale of the property, she elected
her remedy. The rules of damages for conversion
were inapplicable."

*

*

*

"Damages and restitution are alternative remedies and an election to pursue one is a bar to
invoking the other."
POINT Ill.

RESPONDENT'S CLAIM THAT THE
LOSS SUSTAINED BY IT WAS CAUSED
BY APPELLANTS' CONDUCT IS AGAINST
THE LA'V AND EVIDENCE.
\Vhile appellants recognize that the evidence must
be viewed on appeal favorably to respondent, respondent has deliberately ignored undisputed testimony in
its assertions on the question of causation. In Point III
of its brief, respondent omits any reference to or explanation of the dear and unequivocal testimony with
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respect to this point of each of the advertising customeh
involved other than that of Peter 'Vilson. The te~ti
mony of the other customers invo!Yed with respeet t 11
this issue has been detail eel at length in appellants· original brief and will not be repeated herein.
Respondent cites the case of Nichuls-1llurriii ''·
illorris, 174 F.Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y., 1959), relied upon
by appellants, for the proposition that the court therein
rejected the "novel" theory relied upon by appellants.
because the court awarded damages to the plaintiff in
that action. The so-called "novel" theory of appellants
is the very theory articulated by the court in the ]JI orris
case, and is as old as the law of torts itself. The reason
the court awarded damages in the Morris case is not
because the court rejected the theory advanced by defendant therein, but because the court specifically found
that the distributorship would have left the plaintiff
corporation within a year after l\lorris left its employ
in any event; and it therefore based its award of damages
predicated upon one year's loss of profits, realistically
evaluated at $22,500.00.
The distinction to be drawn between the record
in the Morris case and that of the instant case is that
based upon the unequivocal testimony of the various
advertising customers called below, these accounts would
have terminated the services of respondent and engagcrl
Hall as their agent, not within a year of his resignation.
but immediately thereupon.
It is significant further that the court below marle
no finding whatsoeYcr with respect to this factual issue
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Nor does the case of Duane Jones Co., Inc. v.
l/urkc, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y., 1954) relied upon heavily by respondent, support its position. The quoted port.ion of this case at Page 38 of respondent's brief indicates
that the issue raised by appellants in the instant case,
as it relates to causation, was not one that was raised
in the Duane Jones case. The defendants there argued
that the plaintiff had "resigned" its advertising customers, not that its customers would in any event "resign"
the plaintiff.

POINT IV.
IN YIE\V OF THE FINDINGS OF THE
COURT BELOW, THE VALUE OF THE
ADVERTISING ACCOUNTS CANNOT BE
PROPERLY CONSIDERED IN REVIE"T_
ING THE COURT'S A'VARD OF DAMAGES.
Respondent states at Page 44 of its brief that its
approach to the question of damages was from two
standpoints: (I) The value of an advertising account
to an agency, and (2) the revenue derived and expected
from the accounts taken plus the gain to defendants
in the likelihood that it would continue. The findings
of the court below, as noted in appellant's brief, found
only the yross revenue derived by respondent from the
a<Totmts in question and the salary derived by the defendant Hall from the new corporation, neither of
whieh as hercinabove pointed out and as set forth in the
original brief, are proper, because (I) They represent
11

alternative remedies; ( 2) the award of damages must b,
based upon net, not gross revenue; ( 3) the salary of tiH·
defendant Hall, standing alone, is not a proper standard
for the court to follow in determining what, if any gaiu,
both defendants derived as a result of their alleged
wrongful acts.
The significant thing is, however, that responde11t
now argues that the award of damages can be sustained
by reason of the testimony of the witness Alfred (jarrigues, who attempted to fix a value of an advertising
account to an agency. If this is the case, then the findings
of the court are deficient insofar as respondent's Yie11
of the case is concerned because there is no finding a1
to value, which was obviously an integral part of respo11dent's claim for damages.

If, on the other hand, the court's findings are not
deemed to be insufficient for the reason that it omitted
a finding of value, then the only conclusion that this
court can draw therefrom is that the trial court belcm
rejected respondent's testimony regarding value. Thomas v. Clayton Piano Co., 47 U. 91, 151 Pac. 543.

CONCLUSION
Respondents, by conceding that its claim for m011ey
judgment is based upon ( l) the loss to the plaintiff rorporation, measured by the value of the accounts, upon
which no finding was made, and the gross revenue to he
derived therefrom, and ( 2) the ultimate benefit and
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'

ellrichment to defendants therefrom, neither pleaded nor
prore<l below, and an alternative and inconsistent rernedy with the first, compels a reversal of the trial court's
;udgment and a remand for entry of judgment in favor
,I
of appellants' no cause of action or at best, entry of
judgment for respondent for nominal damages only.

Respectfully submitted,

HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN of
DRAPER, SANDACK & SAPERSTEIN
606 El Paso Natural Gas Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants.
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